The Arab Spring has led to very different outcomes across the Arab world. I present a highly stylized model of the Arab Spring to better understand these differences. In this model, dictators from the ethnic or religious majority group concede power if their country is oilpoor, but can stay in power by bribing the people if their country is oil-rich. Dictators from the minority group often rely on other members of their group to repress protests and to fight the majority group if necessary. These predictions are consistent with observed outcomes in Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and elsewhere. JEL-Code: D720, D740.
Introduction
The Arab Spring started with protests and demonstrations in Tunisia in December 2010, and has spread across North Africa and the Middle East. Most dictators initially responded with a mixture of repression and concessions. Nevertheless there are large differences in their responses and, consequently, the outcomes of the Arab spring across the region. In Tunisia and Egypt, the dictators conceded power after mostly peaceful protests lasting less than one month, thereby allowing for political transitions from dictatorships to more democratic regimes. Shortly thereafter, the king of Saudi Arabia announced an extra US-$ 36 billions in benefits to the Saudi people, which was generally viewed as an attempt to bribe them not to protest.
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In Libya and Syria, the dictators responded to protests and demonstrations with political violence, which led to full-blown civil wars. These large differences in the dictators' responses seem puzzling. After all, these dictators and ruling families had all been in power for decades, and they had always shown a large appetite for personal enrichment, but little or no appetite for democracy and civil liberties.
Without denying that many country-specific factors may have influenced the behavior of each single Arab dictator, the goal of this paper is to understand the general pattern of the dictators' responses across the Arab world. For that purpose I present a highly stylized model. In this model the dictator has two options to prevent democratization and to stay in power: he can try to bribe all citizens to stop protesting, or to rely on members of his own ethnic or religious group to repress the protests and to fight other groups if necessary. In equilibrium his behavior depends on the country's oil revenues, and whether or not the dictator belongs to the ethnic or religious majority. A dictator from the majority group can never afford the violent support of the members of his own group, because they know that a democratic majority government would also channel oil revenues towards them, and because political violence is more chaos prone than continued protests. The dictator therefore chooses to bribe all citizens if the country is sufficiently oil-rich, but has no means to avoid democratization and to stay in power if the country is oil-poor. For a dictator from the minority group, it is however cheaper to buy the violent support of the members of his group than to bribe all citizens. Their support is relatively cheap because they benefit considerably less from democratization than the members of the majority group. Therefore, a dictator from the minority group is likely to choose the violent option unless oil revenues are very low.
Let us briefly compare these theoretical predictions with the different responses of the Arab dictators discussed above. Egypt and Tunisia have little oil, and their dictators were from the religious and ethnic majority. The model predicts that these dictators would have to concede power. Saudi Arabia is oil-rich, and the ruling family from the religious and ethnic majority. The model predicts that they would bribe the people. Libya and Syria were both characterized by dictators belonging to minority groups: Asad belongs to Syria's Alawi minority, and Qadhafi came from one of many small tribes in highly fractionalized Libya. Moreover, oil revenues were intermediate in Syria, and relatively high in Libya. The model predicts that civil wars become a likely outcome. The observed outcomes coincide with the model's predictions in all these cases. Below I take a more systematic look at all Arab countries that were dictatorships in 2010. There I confirm that the pattern emerging from my model is by and large consistent with the observed differences in the dictators' responses and, consequently, the outcomes of the Arab Spring across North Africa and the Middle East. This paper contributes to several strands of the political economy literature.
First, it is related to contributions on political transitions from dictatorships to more democratic regimes. Important contributions with an economic perspective include Lipset's (1959) Cuaresma et al., 2011; Tsui, 2011) . This finding is consistent with the theoretical predictions of my model.
Second, my paper is related to theoretical contributions on the effects of a country's ethnic composition on the political struggle for power (e.g., Hodler, 2006; Padró i Miquel, 2007; Ray, 2008, 2011; Morelli and Rohner, 2010; Caselli and Coleman, 2012 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, section 2 solves it, section 3 provides some anecdotal evidence, and section 5 briefly concludes.
The model
There is a country with a dictator and a population of mass 1. The population consists of π A ∈ (1/2, 1) members of majority group A, and π B = 1 − π A members of minority group B. The dictator D I belongs to group I = A, B. The state gets oil revenues R ≥ 0, and can discriminate across citizens based on their group affiliation i = A, B when distributing these revenues.
In this country, there is a window of opportunity for democratization due to some exogenous events, the Arab spring. The dictator can try either peacefully or violently to prevent democratization and to stay in power. His peaceful option is to bribe all citizens. Thereby he offers transfer payments T I put the following restrictions on the probabilities p A , p B and p D :
, where J = I and
Restriction (i) implies that the probability of chaos after political violence, 1
is larger than the probability of chaos after continued protests not met by political violence, 1 − p D . It further implies that the probability of chaos is in both cases less than one half. That is, I assume that the window of opportunity for democratization goes along with circumstances in which the country is not too likely to decent into chaos. Restriction (ii) implies that group I, which supports the dictator and may have disproportionate or even exclusive access to the state's military equipment, has a technological advantage in conflict and violence, such that its relative winning
is at least as high as its population share π I . The dictator's payoff is equal to the oil revenues R minus the promised transfer payments if he remains in power, and zero otherwise. The citizens' payoff consists of several components, and depends on their group affiliation i = A, B. Each citizen gets the promised transfer payment if the dictator stays in power, and (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) benefits δ i ≥ 0 in case of democratization. I assume δ A ≥ δ B , as group A is the majority group. 4 In case of democratization, the majority group A also ensures that the oil revenues R are distributed among its group members. 5 All citizens get a payoff of zero in case of chaos.
To simplify the exposition, I will say that the dictator can afford the peaceful option if he can afford transfer payments T 
Equilibrium
I study separately the cases in which the dictator comes from the majority and the minority group, respectively. In both cases I use backward induction to solve for the subgame-prefect Nash equilibrium.
4 Results do not depend on the assumption that δ B ≥ 0. They would be qualitatively equivalent, but more cumbersome to present, if I just assumed δ A ≥ δ B and δ = π A δ A + π B δ B ≥ 0.
5 It would be straightforward to endogenize this distribution of the oil revenues across groups in a majority voting setup.
Dictator from majority group A
Suppose for now that the dictator comes from majority group A, i.e., I = A. We look at his two options in turn, starting with the peaceful option. Members of group i = A, B accept transfer payments T Proposition 1 shows that a dictator from majority group A is never able to offer transfer payments T vA A that are sufficient to motivate members of his own group to engage in political violence against the other group. The reason is that he can at most offer to distribute all oil revenues R among them if they keep him in power, while they get these oil revenues plus additional benefits δ A in case of democratization. In addition, political violence also raises the probability that the country descends into chaos.
Proposition 1 Proof: These results directly follow from Proposition 1, and Π
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium behavior of a dictator from majority group A is straightforward. He bribes all citizens so that he can stay in power if oil revenues R are sufficiently high, but has no alternative to conceding power otherwise.
This simple equilibrium behavior is the direct consequence of the impossibility of buying violent support from members of the majority group.
Dictator from minority group B
Suppose now that the dictator comes from minority group B, i.e., I = B. The peaceful option -bribing -requires the same transfer payments for a dictator of group B as for a dictator of group A:
Consequently, it also leads to aggregate costs C b B = p D (R + δ), and an expected
We now look at the dictator's violent option, which is to pay the other members of minority group B to engage in political violence. 
The oil revenues R and the aggregate costs C Proof: The statements in the first sentence directly follows from the proof of Proposition 1 and the main text above. It remains to proveR b >R v or, equivalently, , Q 2 > 0 must hold whenever Members of minority group B benefit less from democratization, as the majority government will not channel any oil revenues towards them. Their violent support for repressive polices is thus relatively cheap to get. In fact it is even cheaper than bribing all citizens, because doing so again requires partially compensating members of group A for all the perks they get in case of democratization.
Having discussed when the dictator can afford the two options, we again turn to his equilibrium behavior: If the dictator can afford both options, i.e., if R >R b , he faces a trade-off: The peaceful option allows him to stay in office with higher probability, while the violent option is less expensive and, therefore, leads to a higher payoff if he can stay in office.
A priori, it is unclear which option is more attractive. Proposition 4 shows that the violent option is always more attractive if the dictator's group is relatively strong in political violence, in particular, if p B ≥ 1 − p D . The dictator only seriously consider both options if oil revenues are so high that R >R b and his group so weak that
He may then choose the peaceful option if oil revenues R are high, democratization benefits δ A and δ B relatively small, and his group B at the same time relatively large in size (high π B ) and rather weak in political violence (low p B ).
The general pattern emerging from Propositions 3 and 4 is that both the budget constraints and the incentives of a dictator from the minority group make it likely that he responds with political violence to the Arab spring if the country is not too oil-poor. 
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The anecdotal evidence discussed in this section suggests that the pattern predicted by my model is by and large consistent with the differences in the dictators' responses and, consequently, the outcomes of the Arab Spring observed across North Africa and the Middle East. 12 It remains to look at Morocco, Jordan and Yemen. The kings of Morocco and Jordan could stay in power by promising political reforms, but without resorting to excessive political violence, and without the means to bribe all citizens. Unlike the dictator in my model, these kings might have a sufficiently credible commitment technology. In Yemen, both the relevant circumstances and the dictator's behavior were in some sense in-between those in Egypt and Tunisia, on the one hand, and those in Libya and Syria, on the other hand. Yemen's oil revenues are modest, and it is a tribal society, but the dictator belonged to the religious majority. He initially tried to violently repress the protest with the support of armed tribesmen, but when his repressive policies failed, he conceded power before a full-blown civil war could erupt. See, e.g., "Yemen's demonstrations: Yet more cracking down." The Economist, March 17, 2011; "Middle East and Africa: One year on." The Economist, November 17, 2011; and "Yemen's president: Another one bites the dust." The Economist, January 28, 2012. or religious majority group concede power if their country is oil-poor, but can stay in power by bribing the people if their country is oil-rich. It further predicts that dictators from the minority group are likely to rely on the support of other members of their group to repress protests and to fight the majority group if necessary. I have shown that these predictions are consistent with observed outcomes in, e.g., Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the small Gulf states.
Concluding remarks
The model's focus on the dictator's affiliation to the majority or minority group is novel. It may therefore help to shed new light on political transitions and political conflicts also in divided societies outside the Arab world. Alesina et al. (2003) . In this dataset, there is no ethnicity data for Yemen, and the ethnic groups of Libya are not labeled, just numbered. The dictators' religious and ethnic affiliations are from various Internet sources.
